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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the multilateral approach of Nigeria towards the promotion of democracy 
and security following its return to civil rule since 1999. The Nigerian-led ECOMOG interventions 
in West the African region before the return to civilian governance in 1999 rarely received the 
legitimacy of the international community. Before 1999, Nigeria appeared to lack the credibility 
and credentials to champion democratisation struggles in the region. Nigeria’s military 
intervention in the Liberian civil war (1990-1997) and the restoration of democracy in Sierra 
Leone in 1998 lacked international legitimacy and appeared not to be linked to the nurturing and 
advancement of democracy in West Africa, but rather for the parochial interests of the two 
Generals; Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha. However, following the return of Nigerian to 
democracy in 1999, Nigeria’s military interventions in West African sub-region have been more 
multilateral than unilateral and appear to be linked to advancing stability and the democratisation 
process within the regional frameworks of ECOWAS, backed by the AU and the UN.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The return of Nigeria to democracy in 1999 led to a significant change in Nigeria’s foreign policy 
and military engagement abroad. The damage the ECOMOG missions had done to Nigeria’s 
credibility encouraged the former Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo to re-appraise Nigeria’s 
peacekeeping missions abroad within the few months of his accession to power on 29 May 1999 
(Bach, 2007: 310). In reality, there was no record of expenses incurred by the Babangida and 
2                                                                                                                   Olukayode Dauda Bakare 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Int. j. soc. sci. humanit. educ.                                                                                     ISSN 2521-0041 
Abacha regimes concerning these peacekeeping adventures in both Liberia and Sierra Leone. It 
was estimated that in 1994, $4 billion had been incurred so far, and this was to have increased to 
$12 billion in 1999 when Olusegun Obasanjo took over power (Yoroms, 2004: 318). Persistent 
corruption had been present as the Nigerian senior military officers had transformed Nigerian-led 
ECOMOG peacekeeping missions in both Liberia and Sierra Leone into an avenue for enrichment. 
In 1988-1994, a total of $12.5 billion of Nigeria’s crude oil was not accounted for, a pattern of 
looting that continued through to the regime of General Abacha, who was allegedly personally 
noted for the looting of more than US $3 billion, stashed away in foreign banks. By 1999, the 
number of monies looted by Generals Babangida and Abacha represented roughly 50% of the 
country’s total foreign debt (Bach, 2007: 311). 
After the transition to civilian rule in 1999, checks and balances, diplomacy and principles of 
multilateralism became the guiding principles of the country’s West African sub-regional security 
management. The end of Nigerian unilateralism in 1999 also led to the adoption of an institutional 
framework for the management of peace and security in the sub-region. There are three key organs 
created to promote peace, security and democracy in the West African sub-region. These include 
the Mediation and Security Council, the Defence and Security Commission and the Council of 
Elders. The ECOWAS Peace Plan provided for a regional defence force, trained and equipped 
armies, whose composition comprises all the fifteen ECOWAS countries. The new peace and 
security initiative has promoted a high level of performance, particularly in respect to the 
engagement of Nigerian troops in ECOWAS, AU and UN peacekeeping missions (Bach, 2007: 
312).  
From 1999, Nigeria has experienced a greater level of transformation and multilateralism anchored 
on West African security management, peace enforcement and promotion of democracy. For 
instance, as noted by David Leatherwood:  
“From 1999 to the present, U.S. foreign policy in West Africa has been focused 
on Nigeria as the region’s key state. The idea behind this strategy is that limited 
foreign assistance resources are best spent on a state that understands its 
potential regional hegemony and, more importantly, is willing and able to assert 
itself” (Leatherwood, 2001: 22). 
Nigeria as a potential regional hegemon and anchor state in ECOWAS since 1999 further explains 
the considerable level of foreign military assistance for ECOWAS from the international 
community. For example, the U.S on 1 April 2000, donated aid valued at $10 million and $4 
million to upgrade its military (Leatherwood, 2001: 22). In addition, in July 2000, the U.S. agreed 
to train the Nigerian armies for ten weeks training involving seven battalions- five Nigerians, one 
Senegalese and one Ghanaian (Leatherwood, 2001: 22). 
Almost two decades after Nigeria’s return to democracy, Nigeria has turned into a key mediator in 
ECOWAS’s, UN’s and AU’s peacekeeping on the continent. Conversely, within the West African 
sub-region, Nigeria has incorporated and endorsed the UN’s, the ECOWAS’s and AU’s foreign 
interventions such as the British Special Forces in Sierra Leone (2000-2001) and France’s Licorne 
in Cote d’ Ivoire (2002) into its West African foreign policy initiative. Through ECOWAS, Nigeria 
has become a model and a mentor in efforts to promote and combine multilateralism and 
diplomacy in the areas of conflict resolution and peace enforcement through arbitration and the rule 
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of law in West Africa (Bach, 2007: 310). However, one of the challenges militating against 
Nigeria’s efforts towards the sub-regional security architecture within the ECOWAS and as a 
regional power in West African region, has been the unabated terrorist attacks in the north-east and 
the activities of the militants in the Niger Delta region. For Nigeria to continue to maintain its 
leadership role in the promotion of democracy, peace and security in the region, it must be able to 
overcome the various internal security challenges facing the country. This article investigates the 
role of the Nigerian state in West African security architecture, particularly from 1999. It discusses 
the dynamics of Nigerian foreign policy engagements from unilateralism to multilateralism in the 
pursuit of its national interests towards the maintenance of peace and stability in West African sub-
region. The arguments in this article demonstrate the impact of the return of Nigeria to democracy 
in 1999 on Nigerian West African foreign policy and multilateralism in conflict resolution and 
promotion of democracy in West Africa through the ECOWAS, the African Union (AU) and the 
Union Nations (UN).  The Liberian Civil War, 2002-2005: The Third Nigerian-led ECOMOG 
Military Intervention- Multilateralism and Democratisation 
The peace in Liberia did not last for long: a new round of crises erupted in 1999 and increased until 
2003 when ECOMOG, acting as a rapid reaction force, was dispatched to bring the situation under 
control. The deployment of Nigerian troops in Monrovia was supported by the U.S. Navy and 
Marines. The peacekeeping missions in Cote d’Ivoire and Liberia in 2002-2003 were also carried 
out in close co-operation (multilateralism) with the UN, France and the U.S (Ulriksen, 2010: 370). 
In this case, it may be valid to assert that the regional dimension was stronger in both mandates and 
operational practices (Ulriksen, 2010: 370), unlike the two previous Nigerian-led ECOMOG 
peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone (1990-1997) which were marred with 
rivalries, poor logistics, financial constraints, corruption of Nigerian troops, and lack of joint 
command and control.  
In October 2003, however, the ECOMOG operations in Liberia turned into a multifunctional UN 
mission. It was made possible through the ‘rehatting’ of 3,500 troops from Benin, The Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo as UN troops (Ulriksen, 2010: 370). The 
eventual emergence of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of August 8, 2003, signed by 
the warring factions and other major stakeholders in Liberia was largely negotiated by a Nigerian-
led ECOWAS initiative. The peace agreement represented major elements of the supplementary 
protocol on democracy and good governance, including respect for human rights and the rule of 
law, freedom of association and credible democratic elections (Said, 2016: 222-223). While 
ensuring the need for a peaceful transition to democracy was guaranteed, a special mediator, 
General Abdulsalaam Abubakar, former military president of Nigeria, was appointed to mediate in 
the Liberian peace agreement. His role was significant in negotiating peace during the Liberian 
general elections of October and November 2005, respectively (Said, 2016: 222-223).. 
2. MULTILATERALISM AND DEMOCRATISATION: THE CASE OF GUINEA-
BISSAU, 1998-2014 
Ironically, after the adoption of the Supplementary Protocol on 20 August 2001 a military coup 
was carried out in Guinea-Bissau. The coup had led to the killings of President Joao Bernardo 
Vieira, on 2 March 2009 (Mendy and Lobban, 2013: 128). To ensure that constitutional legality 
was returned in Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria and other AU members suspended Guinea-Bissau in 
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December 2008, following the coup (Nigerian Report, 2010: 124). Before the military coup of 
Guinea-Bissau in 2008, Nigeria had taken a back seat in the conflict that earlier erupted in Guinea-
Bissau in 1998. A committee was created comprising Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Ghana, Guinea, Senegal, The Gambia, Nigeria and Togo as well as the Community of Portuguese-
speaking Countries – CPLP, including Brazil, Portugal, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Mozambique and Angola. The committee formed a Memorandum of Understanding between the 
warring parties on 26 July 1998. The resolution of the peace agreement was the total withdrawal of 
Senegalese and Guinean troops out of Guinea-Bissau and their immediate replacement with 
contingents from Lusophone countries. The peace agreement did not go down well with ECOWAS 
and its members who viewed it as an attempt by outsiders to encroach in their own backyard or 
territory (Kabia, 2009: 138-139). 
After a failed peace agreement and a cease-fire between the parties, the Abuja peace agreement was 
facilitated by CPLP and ECOWAS and was signed in November 1998 by both the warring parties. 
The Abuja peace accord called for a power-sharing agreement between the government and 
mutineers; a government of national unity should co-ordinate a transitional election, together with 
implementing the withdrawal of CPLP troops and their immediate replacement with ECOWAS 
troops. Amidst high levels of mistrust, in January 1999, heavy fighting erupted again with dire 
consequence for the civilian population. With the intervention of Togo’s Foreign Minister, Kokou 
Koffigoh, Vieira and Mane entered into another peace agreement in February 1999 which led to the 
inauguration of Government of National Unity (Kabia, 2009: 139).  
The inability of the ECOMOG troops to bring lasting peace in Guinea-Bissau and Nigeria’s refusal 
to participate in the ECOMOG’s mission in 1999 meant that the warring parties were able to 
overpower the interposition force on 6-7 May 1999 (Mendy and Lobban, 2013: 129). The inability 
of ECOMOG’s troops to sustain effective peacekeeping led to the surrender of the loyalist forces 
and Joao Vieira’s exile in Portugal. Consequently, in the absence of a capable and strong 
interposition force, interim Prime Minister Francisco Jose Fadul had opted for an immediate 
withdrawal of ECOMOG’s troop's operations in Guinea-Bissau, which ended in June 1999 (Mendy 
and Lobban, 2013: 129). The refusal of Nigeria to contribute to the ECOMOG’s troops in the 
country, however, led to the complete failure of the ECOMOG peacekeeping operations in Guinea-
Bissau. This demonstrates the indispensability of Nigeria in regional security management.  
Nonetheless, ECOWAS continued to be active in Guinea-Bissau’s peace process. For example, on 
14 September 2003, after President Koumba Yala was removed through a military coup, led by a 
chief of defence staff, Verissimo Correia Seabra, a delegation was led by the African Union 
chairperson, President Olusegun Obasanjo including the ECOWAS chairperson, John Kufuor 
(Ghanaian President), and President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal to Guinea-Bissau to mediate 
between the parties. The efforts of Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal resulted in a deal with the 
mutineers to create a civilian-led transitional government, the immediate return of the military to 
barracks and the conduct of parliamentary and presidential elections within 6 and 18 months 
respectively (Mendy and Lobban, 2013: 129).  
While acknowledging Nigeria as a regional hegemon and its role in the promotion of regional 
security and democracy, another military coup was carried out in Guinea-Bissau on 12 April 2012. 
The coup interrupted Guinea-Bissau’s presidential election and sent the country into another crisis. 
This led to the deployment of an ECOMOG standby force, which was led by Nigeria, with the 
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support of Burkina Faso and Senegal. Of the ECOMOG troops deployed for the mission, Nigeria 
deployed over 300 personnel including about 186 soldiers and 140 policemen (The Scoop, 2017). 
In view of this, the UN representative, Modibbo Toure, had asked Nigeria to use its influence in the 
regional bloc, ECOWAS, to return the country to a peaceful democracy after the coup (UN, 2016). 
Actually, the situation stabilised in 2012 but was not fully resolved and an ECOMOG presence has 
been in the country since. There was a recent deterioration, and therefore Buhari became involved 
after 2015. Nigerian president Buhari affirmed that:  
“They must accept responsibility for leadership to stabilize their own country”, 
the President warned, adding that the country’s political leaders, not outsiders 
that can effectively resolve the political crisis in the country. President Buhari 
told the visiting envoy that Nigeria would welcome increased support from 
ECOWAS and the United Nations to stabilize the country and prevent the 
breakdown of law and order. President Buhari said Nigeria had a responsibility 
to the region and the rest of Africa and assured that we will not shirk on our 
responsibility, despite the hardship confronting us” (UN, 2016).  
The above statements by President Buhari indicated that Nigeria remained committed to the 
promotion of peace, security and democracy in West Africa. It is indeed imperative that the 
international community recognise Nigeria as an anchor state in Africa which is capable of 
defending and safeguarding West Africa, in collaboration with other members of ECOWAS.  
Nonetheless, Nigeria might be caught again in withdrawing its troops from Guinea-Bissau, a 
possibility that was connected to the country’s internal security challenges and economic crisis. 
According to the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nigeria has spent $75,000,000 in Guinea 
Bissau since 2011. It also contributed US$63,000,000 to the ECOWAS fund for the Defence and 
Security Sector reform in 2011 and US$10,000,000 to enable the Interim Government to function 
effectively in 2012 (The Scoop, 2017). Nigerian military intervention in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) 
was able to return the country to a democratic government under José Mario Vaz in May 2014 for a 
five-year term (ECOWAS, 2017).  
Nevertheless, a sustainable peacekeeping mission is dependent on a strong defence force and 
financial capability. While acknowledging Nigeria’s success in the restoration of democracy in 
Guinea-Bissau in 2014, it is equally important to note that its ability to continue its peacekeeping 
operations in this country is seriously in doubt. For instance, in the face of various domestic 
challenges such as terrorism, kidnapping, and attacks and militia in the Niger Delta, the Nigerian 
president in 2016 announced an immediate withdrawal of Nigerian troops stationed in Guinea-
Bissau to tackle current domestic security challenges. According to President Buhari, “We need our 
troops back home, and I hope the President of that country (Guinea-Bissau) would accept a 
constitutional way to resolve the situation there” (Adetayo, 2016).  
A similar argument on Nigeria’s weariness in sub-regional peacekeeping emerged in 2012-2013, 
during the Malian crisis. Nigeria refused to mobilise its troops for the ECOMOG mission in Mali. 
Former Nigerian president (2010-2015), Goodluck Jonathan in his address to the UN General 
Assembly stated that “too much effort and resources on the military aspect of peace and security 
have been incurred at the expense of mediation and preventive diplomacy” (Brosig, 2015, 144).  In 
the absence of Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces in Mali, the UN Security Council ordered the 
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deployment of ECOWAS contingents to Mali in reference to resolution 2085 on 20th December 
2012 (Brosig, 2015, 144). The Nigerian leadership gap in Mali led to France to rapidly mobilise its 
troops to intervene in order to rescue the Malian government from the clutches of the Islamist 
militias and a Tuareg rebellion, a role that is usually the preserve of Nigeria in ECOMOG’s 
peacekeeping missions (Brosig, 2015: 144). The prospects of Nigerian future peace-keeping 
missions in West Africa, however, will depend largely on the country’s internal stability and 
financial strength. 
3. MULTILATERALISM AND DEMOCRATISATION: THE CASE OF COTE 
D’IVOIRE 
A similar pattern of events in the case of Cote d’Ivoire highlights another perspective which 
underpins Nigeria’s leadership role in the promotion of democracy in ECOWAS. In September 
2002, a civil war erupted in Cote d’Ivoire. The cause of the crisis was an attempted coup against 
the government of Laurent Gbagbo. Following the failure of the attempted mutiny, Nigeria had 
refused to send its troops to Cote d’Ivoire for peacekeeping operations (Cyril, 2009: 128). 
As the war continued, several attempts were made by ECOWAS and France to bring peace and 
stability to Cote d’Ivoire. Unlike the previous peacekeeping missions of Nigeria in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone during the military regimes, the Nigerian civilian government under President 
Olusegun Obasanjo was absent from the Côte d’Ivoire peacekeeping mission, limiting itself to only 
a mediatory role (Cyril, 2009: 128). Similar to the political impasse of Guinea-Bissau, it is 
instructive to note that the ECOWAS peace mission to Côte d’Ivoire was largely carried out with 
French (ex-colonial master) and international community support (Cyril, 2009: 128), a situation 
that will continue to heighten the existing tensions and rivalries between Nigeria and France, 
particularly in the West African sub-region. Cyril noted that Nigeria as a regional power in West 
Africa would seem to have re-appraised and redirected its energy on conflict resolution through 
mediation and diplomacy rather than the employment of military instruments as a tool of 
diplomacy in conflict resolution (Cyril, 2009: 128). It is important to argue that Nigeria may have 
also learnt from its previous peacekeeping missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone before the return to 
democracy in 1999. Similar scenario in division between the ECOWAS as the case of Liberian and 
Sierra Leonean civil wars applied in Côte d’Ivoire, with Nigeria – the traditional rival of France in 
West Africa – seeking to wield its regional pre-eminence and influence in peace-making from 
within the AU (which it chaired in 2004 and 2005) and ECOWAS peace plans (Adekeye, 2008).. 
4. MULTILATERALISM AND DEMOCRATISATION: THE CASE OF THE GAMBIA, 
2016-2017 
The recent ECOWAS’ intervention in the restoration of democracy in The Gambia has been a 
success story. This is a claim which is associated with the long-accumulated wealth of experience 
of the regional bloc, which proved valuable in successfully mediating The Gambia’s post-election 
impasse (Khadiagala, 2018: 15). The Gambia’s post-election crisis presented Nigeria an ample 
opportunity to convince the international community of its regional influence to mediate in political 
and security issues after eighteen years of stable internal. The disputed December 2016 presidential 
elections in The Gambia was the first case where Nigerian-led ECOWAS intervention successfully 
managed to “restore democracy” in the country by using the threat of force but without any use of 
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direct physical violence (Hartmann, 2017: 85). Nigeria’s previous peacekeeping operations in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau had constantly involved both the use of threat of force 
and direct physical violence; however, the restoration of democracy in the country underscores an 
external intervention anchored on a collective mandate of the ECOWAS and the principle of 
multilateralism which embraced the collective participation of other regional blocs beyond West 
Africa. These regional blocs comprise the UN and AU. 
President Yahya Jammeh’s reluctance to accept defeat in the presidential elections of December 
2016 led to ECOWAS’s intervention to restore the legitimate mandate of the people of Gambia. A 
general expectation emerged after the polls that President Yahya Jammeh’s administration has 
come to an end after twenty-six years in power. It took everyone by surprise when on 2 December 
2016 The Gambia Electoral Commission announced opposition candidate Adama Barrow as the 
winner of the presidential election (Hartmann, 2017: 85). Jammeh’s initial speech in a television 
address to the people of The Gambia after the release of the results was to accept defeat and 
congratulated Barrow on his electoral victory (Hartmann, 2017: 85). On December 9, however, 
Yahya Jammeh changed his mind and reiterated that he would challenge the results of the 
elections, citing “serious and unacceptable abnormalities.” Following his refusal to hand over 
power, on 12 and 17 December 2016, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council and the 
ECOWAS Heads of States resolved to a common position in strictly enforcing the results of the 1 
December 2016 elections. Similarly, on 21 December 2016, the United Nations Security Council 
backed and endorsed the AU’s and ECOWAS’s stand to promote legitimate order in the Gambia 
(Williams, 2017).  
ECOWAS, led by the Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari, responded forcefully and quickly, 
demanding that Jammeh step aside by the constitutional inauguration day of 19 January 2017. After 
much diplomatic persuasion, negotiation and mediation failed, ECOWAS opted for a military 
intervention as a last resort and mechanism to restore democracy in the Gambia (Thurston, 2017). 
On January 18, Nigeria sent its military aircraft and personnel to Senegal to reinforce any military 
efforts. Nigeria also sent a warship off the coast, signalling a show of force and to evacuate 
Nigerians (Campbell, 2017). 
Despite all the persuasions and threats mounted by the ECOWAS, the AU and the international 
community, Jammeh held firm and ECOWAS organised the inauguration of Barrow at the 
Gambian Embassy in Senegal and recognised Barrow as The Gambia’s president. ECOWAS began 
to send Senegalese troops into The Gambia and secured the backing and mandate of the African 
Union and the United Nations Security Council. In the face of tense military surveillance of 
ECOWAS in Banjul, Jammeh finally agreed to accept exile and left The Gambia on 21 January 
2017 (Thurston, 2017). 
5. NIGERIA AND ECOWAS: COUNTER-TERRORISM INITIATIVES 
Terrorism has taken on more profound significance in the contemporary global system. Africa has 
its own peculiar domestic causes of ideologically-induced violent non-state insurgents that are 
responsible for periodic attacks on the government’s institutions and the public (Forest and Giroux, 
2011). For example, the cases of the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, al-Shabaab in Somalia or 
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in North Africa have all attracted media and global attention. In 
addition to the domestic collection of ideologically-inspired violent non-state actors, some 
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irresponsible governments also often employ terrorist tactics to crack down on their oppositions, as 
in Zimbabwe, or the Eritrean government’s support (according to a recent UN report) for terrorist 
plots against African leaders gathering in Ethiopia (Forest and Giroux, 2011).  
Similarly, poverty, socio-economic conflicts and corruption in most West African states underline 
the vulnerability of the region to terrorism (Cyril, 2006: 88). Of particular note is the case of 
‘networked wars’ that engulfed Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1990s, which spread across the 
neighbouring countries and the subsequent outbursts of civil war in Guinea-Bissau between 1998 
and 1999 and in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002 (Cyril, 2006: 88). Porous borders, ungoverned spaces, the 
untrained and ill-equipped military have also contributed to the relative success of Islamic sects in 
recent times (Ray, 2016: 2). Nigeria is not left out from this global threat of terrorism, however, as 
the country continues to face continuous insurgency, especially in the north-east of Nigeria. 
In the midst of economic growth and natural resources, the country has been faced with increased 
activities of the Islamist sect called Boko Haram in north-eastern Nigeria since 2010 (Ray, 2016: 
2). Boko Haram activities and other terrorist attacks in Nigeria in the past decade have been a 
national and regional security challenge for the Nigerian state and the entire West African sub-
region. On 16 June 2011, a suicide bomber belonging to Boko Haram attacked the headquarters of 
the Nigerian Police Force, Abuja, targeting the inspector general of police who narrowly escaped 
death. On 25 August 2011, a group of terrorists launched an attack on the United Nations building 
located in Abuja, Nigeria, killing about 23 people, including 18 UN officials (Ismail, 2013: 235). 
Attacks on oil installations, the kidnapping of oil workers and stealing of oil from pipelines in the 
Niger Delta region by militant groups have continued to attract international attention in recent 
times (Cyril, 2006: 88).  
As a result, the US and other Western allies have become more responsive and committed to the 
anti-terrorist war as the West African region becomes a new frontline in the Global War on Terror 
(GWOT). This strategic approach led to the creation of the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), targeting 
Mali, Mauritania, Chad and Niger, in 2002. In 2005, the Pan-Sahel Initiative was transformed into 
the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), covering Nigeria and other countries in 
Africa (Alli, 2012: 62).  
Nonetheless, these and other counter-terrorist initiatives have not adequately addressed and 
curtailed terrorism. ECOWAS, therefore, took a more proactive measure in February 2013 at the 
42nd Ordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government in February 2013 and 
adopted a Counterterrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan to eradicate terrorism in West Africa 
(Salihu, 2015: 3). 
Nigeria’s efforts to combat terrorism can be noted in various multilateral approaches and 
engagements with its neighbouring states, to assist in the policing of its porous borders and to 
prevent Boko Haram from launching attacks from across the borders. The counter-terrorist 
initiative was Nigeria’s attempt to secure international support for the war against terrorism 
(Falode, 2016). In effect, the Nigerian government in 2012 signed a multi-lateral security pact with 
its neighbours and with selected strategic partners beyond the West African region (Falode, 2016). 
The U.S. has also been supportive in this direction. In 2014, Washington provided logistical 
support such as counter-Improvised Explosive Device training and forensics training for the 
Nigerian military (The White House, 2014).  
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It is, however, imperative that Nigeria, as a regional leader in West Africa, must continue to live up 
to the expectation of its neighbours in sub-regional security architecture. Western powers, 
believing that Nigeria has a crucial role to play, have continued to exert pressure on it to put in 
more effort in the fight against terrorism in West Africa (Alli, 2011: 62). The failure or 
incapacitation of a state to protect its territory against internal or external threats is also a major 
challenge to the realisation of Nigeria’s promotion of democracy in its sub-region. The country 
thus solely relies on the collective efforts of its neighbouring states and Western allies in the fight 
against terrorism within its territory, therefore Nigerian ability to maintain in regional security by 
itself has been clearly weakened in recent years, faced with the constant challenge of internal 
attacks by Boko Haram and the Niger Delta militants, who have continuously unleashed attacks on 
civilians and government officials. 
6. CONCLUSION 
This article has examined the role of Nigeria in the promotion of security and democracy in the 
West African sub-region, as well as its engagement with the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) since the return to democracy in 1999. The current environment of 
Nigeria’s West Africa foreign policy since 1999, however, demonstrates a commitment to 
promoting sub-regional peace, security and democracy through multilateralism, diplomacy and 
mediation. For instance, unlike the Nigerian-led ECOMOG’s peacekeeping missions in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone, which lacked the support of the UN and the U.S., the third Nigerian-led ECOMOG 
military intervention in Liberia from 1999-2003 was carried out under close UN military 
supervision and supported by U.S. navy and marines. The Nigerian-led ECOMOG peacekeeping 
missions in Cote d’Ivoire in 2002-2003 were also carried out with close military co-operation with 
the UN, France and the U.S.A (Ulriksen, 2010: 370). Similarly, Nigeria was also instrumental to 
the success of the Liberian presidential elections which were conducted in November and 
December 2005. There is no doubt that rapid deployment of ECOWAS’s troops in the restoration 
of peace, security and democracy in Liberia in 2003 led to the subsequent rapid deployment of the 
UN peacekeepers (Ulriksen, 2010: 370). In fact, Nigeria’s diplomatic and multilateral engagement 
in the international community towards the promotion of peace and security in West Africa since 
1999 would seem particularly promising for Nigeria to continue to pursue its historic leadership 
ambitions in the sub-region.  
It should also be noted that Nigeria’s neo-conservatism in West Africa since 1999 may be linked to 
the propagation and promotion of democracy in the region. The type of operation carried out in The 
Gambia is unique in the history of ECOWAS’s military interventions in the internal affairs of 
member states. Only on a few cases has a joint-multinational task force, led by Nigeria, intervened 
promptly with the express purpose of restoring a democratically elected government and with the 
assistance of the United Nations Security Council. However, there are challenges militating against 
Nigeria’s effective leadership in ECOWAS. First, ECOWAS’ and Nigeria’s over-dependence on 
the UN and key global powers, such as the US, France and Britain for military intervention and 
restoration of democracy in West Africa has serious implications for Nigeria’s West African 
leadership and legitimacy of the mission (Iwilade and Agbo, 2012: 364). Second, ECOWAS’ 
tradition of relying on the ‘’big brother role’’ and willingness of its regional hegemon (Nigeria) to 
shoulder the military, economic and political implications of all the peace missions in the region 
(Iwilade and Agbo, 2012: 364). 
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In the final analysis, Nigeria’s role in the promotion of peace, security and democracy ECOWAS 
since its return to civilian rule in 1999 is largely uncontested. Through Nigerian leadership, 
ECOWAS has kept the pace, gained the collective muscle to root out dictators through a broad 
range of interventions (Khadiagala, 2018: 16) approved and backed by the African Union (AU) and 
the United Nations. The application of sanctions applied by ECOWAS in almost two decades since 
the adoption of the 2001 Protocol for Democracy and Good Governance have also had tremendous 
and self-reinforcing effects, such that only four out of fifteen countries in West African states, 
including Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana, and Nigeria have managed to endure relative internal 
democratic stability (Khadiagala, 2018: 16).  
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